As the weeks pass, the transition framework being tested by the US State Department for Venezuela is becoming increasingly clear. On Monday, October 26, a senior State Department official told the press:
“Once those two things are in place – the new TSJ at the end of this year, the new CNE very shortly thereafter, and that work is already beginning – what should happen at that point is that then they will have to declare – Delcy will have to declare a vacancy in the presidency, a permanent vacancy. Right now they haven’t done that. Once you declare a permanent vacancy, that triggers, under their exiting constitution, a six-month period for new elections. And the CNE, this nonpolitical new CNE, will then determine the date of that election and when it should happen and when it should be.“
Secretary of State Rubio has been consistent on this point: institutional conditions in Venezuela must be restored before elections can be held. This is also what Venezuelans have demanded for years: an independent Supreme Court, TSJ, and an electoral board, CNE that ensure that the will expressed through elections is respected. This is the exact opposite of what occurred in 2024, when the regime used the CNE and the TSJ to disregard the electoral victory of Edmundo González Urrutia.
Venezuela must undergo a process of institutional reorganization, which will be a central component of the political transition. The first issue to be addressed is the “absolute absence” in the Presidency of the Republic following January 3. While the individual who served as Executive Vice President has filled that void, under the Venezuelan Constitution, it is indisputable that we are facing a case of “absolute absence,” which must be resolved according to the rules outlined in the Constitution itself.
In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber could play a significant role by interpreting—in accordance with the Constitution—any questions that may arise concerning this “absolute absence” and how it should be resolved. Furthermore, regarding the organization of elections, the Electoral Chamber could play a decisive role by resolving issues related to restoring the conditions for electoral integrity—conditions that are essential in Venezuela.
Given the lack of political will on the part of the interim authorities to repeal laws that run counter to human rights, the Constitutional Chamber could declare such laws null and void.
This is why the roadmap adopted by the negotiating team is based on a sound logic: Venezuela’s institutional vulnerability is so severe that the country cannot sustain an electoral process—such as one for the presidency—without first stabilizing, at the very least, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and the National Electoral Council.
Naturally, this is not incompatible with the demand for elections, as María Corina Machado calls for.
However, it seems both logical and prudent first to restore the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and the National Electoral Council to take that step securely.
