Under Washington’s watch, Jorge Rodríguez and Dinorah Figuera signed an agreement in mid-August pledging to overhaul Venezuela’s Supreme Court through an unprecedented process.
When Marco Rubio outlined the Trump administration’s plans for Venezuela in January, the sequence appeared straightforward enough. First came stabilization, then economic recovery and reconciliation, and finally a democratic transition. The decision to leave Delcy Rodríguez and much of the chavista establishment in power was presented as a necessary precaution against the collapse of the Venezuelan state. Almost eleven months later, Washington is confronting a problem that was apparent from the beginning: the institutions it chose to preserve are not necessarily capable of delivering the democracy it promised.
Rubio now insists that Venezuela needs a new Supreme Court, a new electoral authority, and reforms to its security forces before credible elections can take place. In late October, he acknowledged that the country’s electoral infrastructure had been designed to manipulate elections. By November 9, he was describing a timetable under which new Supreme Court justices would be appointed by mid-December, followed shortly afterward by a new National Electoral Council and a declaration of presidential vacancy that would open the way to elections.
There is an irony in this sequence. The Supreme Court whose composition Washington now considers inadequate was the same institution whose interpretation of the Constitution allowed Rodríguez to assume the presidency after Maduro’s capture. Its authority was apparently sufficient to preserve the continuity of the chavista government, but not to establish the conditions for its eventual replacement.
Negotiations are taking place between actors who currently possess the means to make and enforce an agreement, not the ones who might deserve a seat at the table.
This does not necessarily mean that Washington’s initial decision was wrong. Preserving a functioning administration after January 3 avoided the enormous risks of dismantling the Venezuelan state or assuming direct responsibility for governing it. But the usefulness of those institutions for maintaining continuity never established their suitability for organizing a democratic transfer of power.
The problem is no longer whether Venezuela needs institutional reform. Even Washington now acknowledges that it does. The question is what those reforms will actually change.
The Pinochet next door
In an October essay for Caracas Chronicles, Paola Bautista de Alemán argued that Venezuelans must come to terms with the uncomfortable compromises of a negotiated transition. The revolution many had imagined never happened. Maduro was removed, but much of the political establishment that sustained him remained in place. The task now is to work within those circumstances rather than continue expecting a clean break with the past.
There is considerable historical precedent for that argument. Transitions rarely begin with everyone receiving what they believe they deserve. They involve negotiations between actors who distrust one another, concessions to people who may have committed serious abuses, and institutional arrangements that would be unacceptable under ordinary democratic circumstances.
Years ago, when I worked with Sergio Bitar in Washington, Allende’s Mining Minister and a political prisoner under Pinochet, he told me about the discomfort of serving in the Chilean Senate while Augusto Pinochet occupied a seat on the other side of the chamber. Pinochet had left the presidency in 1990, but remained commander in chief of the army for another eight years before taking his lifetime senate seat. For people who had opposed his dictatorship, and paid the price for that opposition, his continued presence in Chilean public life was an extraordinarily bitter pill. Yet the transition had proceeded without first eliminating every privilege the former regime retained.
Everyone understood that there would be bitter pills to swallow. They become considerably easier to swallow when there is something to wash them down with.
Venezuela will face its own version of those compromises. Some opposition institutions that have spent years asserting claims to legitimacy will have to accept that they no longer have a meaningful role in shaping the transition. The Supreme Court in exile, whose members have struggled to recover political relevance, is unlikely to find a place in the institutional arrangements now being negotiated. Other opposition figures will have to acknowledge that they are not the ones setting the terms of the agreement.
Even María Corina Machado, whose return in October demonstrated the mobilizing capacity she continues to command, faces that reality. Her supporters can influence the political environment, demand guarantees, and prepare for elections, but Washington has already empowered a particular set of Venezuelan actors to negotiate the institutional arrangements. Machado’s popular support does not automatically give her control over those negotiations.
None of this means that the resulting agreement must be accepted without criticism. It means recognizing that the negotiations are taking place between actors who currently possess the means to make and enforce an agreement, not the ones who might deserve a seat at the table.
The chavista establishment, for its part, will have to make concessions of a very different kind. It is being asked to surrender control over institutions that have been indispensable to its survival, beginning with the judiciary and the electoral authorities, and eventually, if Washington’s timetable holds, the presidency itself.
The danger is that a settlement negotiated between the government and a limited number of opposition parties could reproduce the very arrangements that prevented Venezuelans from choosing their leaders freely.
These are not equivalent sacrifices. Relinquishing a claim to political representation is not the same as relinquishing control of the institutions that determine who exercises power. But both reflect the uncomfortable reality of a settlement in which no participant will obtain everything they want.
The difficulty with the arrangement that emerged in January was that Venezuelans were being asked to accept these compromises long before they could see much in return. For months, the survival of the chavista establishment was defended as the necessary price of stability, while economic agreements and MOUs moved forward, and the institutional foundations of authoritarian rule remained largely untouched.
Everyone understood that there would be bitter pills to swallow. They become considerably easier to swallow when there is something to wash them down with.
The reforms Rubio is now demanding could finally provide that missing counterpart. Whether they end up helping will depend on three questions that remain unanswered.
New institutions, but who will run them?
The first concerns the Supreme Court. Replacing its current magistrates would address one of the most visible sources of the judiciary’s dependence on the chavista establishment. It would also allow a new court to address the constitutional question that its predecessor left unresolved: the permanent absence of Nicolás Maduro.
But will the new Court be genuinely independent?
The selection process has already introduced some encouraging changes. A reformed Judicial Nominations Committee now gives civil society a majority of its seats, while a separate council of jurists reviews candidates’ credentials. Hundreds of lawyers, including respected figures from well outside the chavista establishment, have applied for the 32 vacancies. Yet the final appointments remain in the hands of a chavista-controlled National Assembly, and candidates must still pass through institutions whose independence has long been questioned.
The question is whether the negotiations can produce a genuinely independent Supreme Court or merely a more sophisticated arrangement for distributing judicial appointments among the parties to the agreement.
The same problem applies to the National Electoral Council. Rubio has called for an electoral authority that is administrative rather than political, an understandable ambition in a country where the electoral system has been repeatedly subordinated to the interests of the government.
A broader national settlement will eventually require the participation of Venezuelans well beyond the elites negotiating today.
Yet the composition of the new CNE is only the beginning. Its independence will also be tested by its willingness to permit political competition, restore confidence in the Electoral Register, guarantee observation, and enable millions of Venezuelans living abroad to participate. Many of these tasks fall far beyond the control of the electoral authority and within the realm of government-aligned institutions, like identity office SAIME and the Foreign Ministry.
The danger is that a settlement negotiated between the government and a limited number of opposition parties could reproduce the very arrangements that prevented Venezuelans from choosing their leaders freely. An electoral council in which political factions merely exchange guarantees of mutual accommodation is not necessarily an independent electoral council.
The third question is the toughest one: what happens to the armed forces and the security apparatus?
Rubio has acknowledged that elections cannot produce a stable democratic government if the security forces refuse to obey whoever wins. But compared with the proposed judicial and electoral reforms, there has been remarkably little public discussion of what transforming Venezuela’s military and intelligence institutions would actually entail.
Replacing a defense minister or appointing new commanders would not necessarily change the loyalties, incentives, or informal networks through which the chavista establishment has exercised control. Nor can the question be resolved simply by demanding the removal of every officer associated with the previous government.
How much of chavismo’s coercive machinery can survive a democratic transition without continuing to determine the limits of civilian authority?
The military leadership will almost certainly seek assurances about its future. Those assurances may be necessary to obtain cooperation, but they also risk preserving the capacity of unelected actors to constrain whoever eventually assumes the presidency.
There have been reports of negotiations concerning a possible departure of Diosdado Cabello, including suggestions that he could receive guarantees allowing him to relocate abroad. Those reports remain unconfirmed, but they raise a question that applies well beyond Cabello himself. How much of the coercive machinery built under chavismo can survive a democratic transition without continuing to determine the limits of civilian authority?
Venezuela’s democratic history offers ample reason to take the question seriously. An elected president who cannot command the institutions responsible for enforcing the law would inherit the office without necessarily inheriting the power to govern.
A settlement under pressure
The Democratic victory in November’s midterm elections has added urgency to an already complicated transition. A new Congress will bring greater scrutiny of Washington’s arrangements with Rodríguez, particularly its financial and energy agreements, while limiting the administration’s political room for maneuver. Rubio’s institutional timetable predates the election, but the pressure to deliver results has only increased.
Meanwhile, Machado’s October return demonstrated that political influence extends beyond the negotiating table. The civic networks that exposed the fraud in 2024 remain capable of mobilizing Venezuelans and demanding accountability, even if they cannot dictate the terms of the agreements now taking shape.
Those agreements don’t need to resolve every grievance accumulated during 27 years of chavismo. Its immediate purpose should be to establish the conditions for competitive elections and ensure that whoever wins can actually govern. A broader national settlement, addressing justice, constitutional reform, civilian control of the military, and democratic coexistence, will eventually require the participation of Venezuelans well beyond the elites negotiating today.
After nearly a year of being told what they must accept in the name of stability, Venezuelans have every reason to ask what they will receive in return.